The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance by McPhee, Gregory P
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Accountancy Dissertations School of Accountancy
5-11-2013
The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing,
and Task Type on Performance
Gregory P. McPhee
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Accountancy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
McPhee, Gregory P., "The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance." Dissertation, Georgia State
University, 2013.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12
i 
 
PERMISSION TO BORROW 
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from 
Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available for inspection 
and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type. I agree that permission 
to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his/her 
absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his absence, by the Dean of the 
Robinson College of Business. Such quoting, copying, or publishing must be solely for the scholarly 
purposes and does not involve potential financial gain. It is understood that any copying from or 
publication of this dissertation which involves potential gain will not be allowed without written 
permission of the author. 
 
Gregory Patrick McPhee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
NOTICE TO BORROWERS 
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in accordance with 
the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
Gregory Patrick McPhee 
School of Accountancy 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business     
Georgia State University        
35 Broad Street NW        
Atlanta, GA 30303  
 
The directors of this dissertation are: 
Professor R. Lynn Hannan and Assistant Professor Ivo D. Tafkov 
School of Accountancy 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business     
Georgia State University        
35 Broad Street NW        
Atlanta, GA 30303  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF NON-CASH INCENTIVES, PAYOFF TIMING, AND TASK TYPE ON 
PERFORMANCE 
 
BY 
 
GREGORY PATRICK MCPHEE 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2013 
iv 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
GREGORY PATRICK MCPHEE 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Gregory Patrick McPhee’s Dissertation 
Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of Philosophy in Business 
Administration in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of Georgia State University. 
 
 
 H. Fenwick Huss, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
Dr. R. Lynn Hannan (Co-Chair) 
Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov (Co-Chair) 
Dr. Jennifer R. Joe 
Dr. Detmar W. Straub  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful for the guidance and support of my dissertation committee: Lynn Hannan (co-chair), Ivo 
Tafkov (co-chair), Jennifer Joe and Detmar Straub. I would also like to thank Steve Fuller, Keri-Ann 
Gooden-Sanderson, Clive Lennox, Terence Ng, Antoinette Smith, Krishnamurthy Surysekar, Hun Tong 
Tan, Kim Westermann and the workshop participants at Georgia State University, Florida International 
University and Nanyang Technological University. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support 
provided by the Institute of Management Accountants Research Foundation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ix 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  1  
 
CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES   5 
2.1 Effects of Non-cash Incentives on Performance  5 
2.2 Economic Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Performance  7 
2.3 Conceptualizing Incentives and Effects of Payoff Timing  8 
2.3.1 Construal Level Theory and Psychological Distance  9 
 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Incentives  10  
 2.3.3 Effects of Incentive Payoff Timing on How Incentives Are  11 
 Conceptualized   
 2.3.4 Matching of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing 12  
2.4 Effects of Incentive Type, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on  13 
Performance  
2.4.1 Information Processing and Task Type 13 
2.4.2 Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Analytic and  14 
Creative Task Performance  
 
CHAPTER III: METHOD 16 
3.1 Experimental Design and Task Description 16 
3.2 Experimental Procedures 17 
3.3 Incentive Type 19 
3.4 Payoff Timing 20 
3.5 Task Type 20 
3.6 Participants  21 
 
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 22 
4.1 Validation of Operational Variables 22 
4.2 Measures and Descriptive Statistics 23 
4.3 Tests of Hypotheses and Research Question 24 
4.4 Supplemental Analysis 26 
4.4.1 Perceptions of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing as Predictors of  26 
 Performance 
4.4.2 Intrinsic Task Interest  27 
4.4.3 Variation in Positive Perceptions 28 
  
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 32 
 
REFERENCES 34 
 
FIGURES 39 
Figure 1: Experiment Timeline 39 
Figure 2: Problems Solved-Analytic 40 
 Figure 3: Problems Solved-Creative 41  
  
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 
 
TABLES 42 
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics-Analytic Task 42 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics-Creative Task 43 
 Table 3: Test of Hypotheses and Research Question 44 
 Table 4: Intrinsic Task Interest 45 
 Table 5: Responses to Post-experiment Questions 46 
 
APPENDICES 48 
 Appendix A: Incentive Bonus Descriptions 48 
 Appendix B: Task Screenshots 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF NON-CASH INCENTIVES, PAYOFF TIMING, AND TASK TYPE ON 
PERFORMANCE  
 
BY 
 
GREGORY PATRICK MCPHEE 
 
APRIL 17, 2013 
 
 
Committee Co-Chairs: Dr. R. Lynn Hannan (Co-Chair) 
Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov (Co-Chair) 
 
Major Academic Unit: Accounting 
My study investigates whether the effects of non-cash incentives on employee performance depend on 
when the incentive is paid and what type of task is being performed. Although firms frequently use non-
cash incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards, the effects of non-cash incentives, 
relative to cash incentives, are not well understood by researchers. Drawing on economic and psychology 
theories, I predict that the effects of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on performance depend on 
incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative). Specifically, for an 
analytic task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future is most effective. For a 
creative task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid 
in the distant future are most effective. The results of my study should benefit theory and practice by 
identifying the most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing for a given task type. 
 
 
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research has found that up to 67 percent of firms motivate employees using non-cash 
incentives such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards (Incentive Federation 2011). 
Despite the widespread use of non-cash incentives, little is known about how they affect 
employee behavior (Jeffrey 2009; Presslee et al. 2013). Because non-cash incentives are 
frequently used by firms but are not well understood by researchers, it is important to identify 
factors that influence their effectiveness compared to an economic benchmark of cash incentives. 
Knowing when non-cash incentives are equally as effective as cash incentives is important since 
non-cash incentives are often less expensive than their retail cash equivalents (Oyer 2008).  
I predict that the effect of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on employee performance 
depends on incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative). 
When employees are performing analytic tasks, I predict that cash paid in the near future will be 
the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination. When employees are 
performing creative tasks, I predict that cash paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive 
paid in the distant future will be the two most effective incentive type and payoff timing 
combinations. Finally, I pose the research question of whether a cash incentive with a near future 
payoff or a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff is the most effective incentive type 
and payoff timing combination when employees are performing a creative task.  
These predictions are based on economic and psychology theories. Conventional 
economic theory suggests that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the most effective 
incentive type and payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Samuelson 1937; 
Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Cash incentives are more effective than non-cash incentives 
because cash is fungible and has greater value in exchange (Baker et al. 1988). Near future 
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payoffs are more effective than distant future payoffs because individuals generally discount near 
future events less than distant future events (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960). 
In contrast to conventional economic theory, psychology theory suggests that the effect 
of incentive type on performance will depend on how a particular incentive type and payoff 
timing combination is conceptualized by the employee and whether this conceptualization 
activates an information processing orientation that is appropriate for a particular task (Liberman 
and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 
2010). Construal Level Theory (CLT) suggests that individuals conceptualize future events either 
concretely or abstractly depending on the characteristics and timing of the event (Liberman and 
Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003). To the extent that a future event is concretely 
conceptualized (because it is characterized by specific details and is anticipated to occur in the 
near future), individuals will adopt a localized information processing orientation that is well 
suited to performing analytic tasks (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010). 
To the extent that a future event is abstractly conceptualized (because it is characterized by 
general characteristics and is anticipated to occur in the distant future), individuals will adopt a 
global information processing orientation that is well suited to performing creative tasks (Forster 
et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007 Malkoc et al. 2010).  
This study draws on CLT to argue that the effect of incentive type on performance will 
depend on whether a particular incentive type and payoff timing combination is concretely or 
abstractly conceptualized and whether this conceptualization activates an information processing 
orientation that is well-suited for a particular task. When employees conceptualize an incentive 
payoff concretely, due to the detailed characteristics of the incentive and the immediacy of the 
payoff (e.g. cash incentive paid in near future), employees will process information in a 
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localized, piecemeal fashion. This localized processing orientation is well-suited for performing 
structured, analytic tasks such as parts assembly or matching vendors’ invoices to purchase 
orders. When employees conceptualize an incentive abstractly, due to the general characteristics 
of the incentive and the deferral of the payoff (e.g. dream vacation redeemed in the distant 
future), employees will adopt a global, holistic information processing orientation. This global 
information processing orientation is well-suited for performing unstructured, creative tasks such 
as new product development.  
 Incentive type, payoff timing and task type are also important to practice because they 
are under the firm’s control and have an impact on employee and firm performance (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991; Kole 1997; Prendergast 1999; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Oyer 2008; 
Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010; Backes-Gellner and Tuor 2010; Eaton and Rosen 2012). For 
example, firms manage incentive type by using non-cash incentives to reduce compensation 
costs (Oyer 2008) and to attract and retain specific types of employees (Backes-Gellner and Tuor 
2010).1 Firms manage payoff timing by deferring compensation in order to prevent employees 
from engaging in short-term manipulation of the incentive scheme and to improve retention of 
desirable employees (Prendergast 1999; Eaton and Rosen 2012). Firms manage task type by 
combining different tasks and task attributes into a single job in order to improve operating 
efficiency and incentive scheme effectiveness (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Kachelmeier et 
al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010).  
This study investigates how incentive type, incentive payoff timing and task type affect 
performance using a 2 x 2 x 2 between-group, within-subjects, mixed design. It manipulates 
incentive type between subjects by varying the type of performance bonus participants receive 
                                                            
1
 For example, only outdoor enthusiasts are likely to be attracted by REI, the outdoor equipment retailer, offering 
employees discounts on outdoor recreation equipment and free equipment rentals 
(http://www.rei.com/jobs/pay.html).  
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(cash or non-cash). The study manipulates incentive payoff timing between subjects by varying 
when the participants receive their performance bonus (near future or distant future). It 
manipulates task type within subjects by having participants perform both analytic and creative 
tasks. The primary dependent variable is task performance which measures each participant’s 
overall performance on each task.  
Consistent with these predictions, the effects of incentive type on performance depend on 
incentive payoff timing and task type. When performing an analytic task, the most effective 
combination of incentive type and payoff timing is cash paid in the near future. When 
performing a creative task, the most effective combinations of incentive type and payoff timing 
are cash paid in the near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future.  
The study has important implications for practice because it identifies when non-cash 
incentives can be substituted for cash incentives without a reduction in employee performance. 
Specifically, results demonstrate that while cash paid in the near future is most effective for an 
analytic task, a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future is as effective as cash paid in the 
near future for a creative task. Knowing when non-cash incentives are as effective as cash is 
important because non-cash incentives are often less expensive to firms than their retail cash 
equivalents (Oyer 2008). Non-cash incentives are often less expensive because firms can 
purchase them at wholesale prices and award them to employees at retail prices. 
This study also contributes to accounting research in several ways. First, it provides 
insights into the effects of non-cash incentives on performance which is important since this 
incentive type is used by up to 67 percent of firms but is not well understood by researchers 
(Incentive Federation 2011; Presslee et al. 2013). Second, it contributes to accounting research 
by showing how both economic preferences and information processing effects can affect 
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employee performance and incentive scheme effectiveness (Bonner et al. 2000; Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002). By showing that the effect of incentive type on performance depends on payoff 
timing and task type, the study complements conventional economic theory, a set of arguments 
that implies that cash paid in the near future is the most effective combination regardless of task 
type (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Finally, the present study contributes 
to a growing body of research related to the effect of incentives on the performance of creative 
tasks, a topic that has been identified as being an important area for future accounting research 
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical 
background and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the experimental design. Section 
IV presents the results of the experiment. Section V summarizes the study’s main findings and 
implications. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Effects of Non-cash Incentives on Performance 
Non-cash incentives are incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and retail gift 
cards, that have monetary value but cannot be readily exchanged into an equivalent cash amount 
(Incentive Federation Inc. 2007; Long and Shields 2010; Presslee et al. 2013). 2 Although non-
cash incentives are extensively used across industries and functional areas and have an estimated 
annual cost of $46 billion, they are not well understood by accounting researchers (Incentive 
Federation Inc. 2007; Presslee et al. 2013). To address this gap in the accounting literature, this 
study investigates the effect of non-cash incentives on employee performance compared to an 
                                                            
2
 Some non-cash incentives are symbolic and have no monetary value such as employee recognition awards and 
plaques (Long and Shields 2010). In contrast, non-cash incentives are defined here as non-cash awards that have 
monetary value in order to be consistent with prior accounting studies (e.g., Presslee et al. 2013) and because it 
allows me to directly compare their performance effects with the performance effects of equivalently valued cash 
incentives.  
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economic benchmark of cash incentives. It is important to examine factors affecting the 
effectiveness of different incentive types because incentives can influence how employees use 
accounting information (see Bonner and Sprinkle 2002 for a review).  
This study builds on Presslee et al. (2013) who find that employees awarded non-cash 
incentives have greater goal commitment than employees awarded cash incentives but set less 
challenging goals and perform at a lower level (Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded non-
cash incentives have greater goal commitment because non-cash incentives have greater hedonic 
appeal than cash incentives (Jeffrey 2009). Employees awarded non-cash incentives set less 
challenging goals because they are more loss averse as a result of how they mentally account for 
each incentive type (Thaler 1999; Kahneman 2003; Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded non-
cash incentives are more loss averse because prospective losses have a disproportionately large 
effect on non-cash incentive mental accounts, which are relatively smaller and used less 
frequently than cash incentive mental accounts (Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded non-
cash incentives perform at a lower level because task performance and goal difficulty often have 
a positive relationship, i.e., setting less difficult goals results in lower performance (Locke and 
Latham 1990; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).  
This study extends Presslee et al. (2013) by using economic and psychology theories to 
predict the circumstances under which non-cash incentives can have similar performance effects 
as cash incentives despite differences in mental accounting. While conventional economic theory 
implies that cash incentives paid in the near future will be the most effective incentive type and 
payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 
1988), Construal Level Theory (CLT) suggests that the effect of incentives on performance will 
also depend on information processing effects unrelated to employees’ economic preferences 
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(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; 
Malkoc et al. 2010). 
2.2 Economic Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Performance 
Conventional economic theory suggests that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the 
most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Taylor 
1914; Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Ainslie 1975; Smith 1976; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick 
et al. 2002; Peterson and Luthans 2006; Long and Shields 2010). According to this viewpoint, 
cash incentives are more effective than non-cash incentives because cash is fungible and has 
greater value in exchange (Baker et al. 1988; Peterson and Luthans 2006). Cash incentives are 
thought to be more effective because employees derive utility from being able to independently 
choose how to spend their cash bonuses while they are constrained in how they spend their non-
cash bonuses (Peterson and Luthans 2006). Finally, cash incentives are more effective than non-
cash incentives because employees’ utilities for monetary rewards are non-satiable and 
characterized by a “monotone increasing function of the monetary reward” (Smith 1976).3 That 
cash incentives can be effectively used by firms to motivate employees is evidenced by the long-
standing practice of companies using monetary incentives to induce or reward desired employee 
behavior (Taylor 1914).4  
Near future payoffs are more effective than distant future payoffs as individuals discount 
near future events less than distant future events and individuals have a psychological preference 
                                                            
3
 Smith’s postulate of non-satiation posits that when an individual is provided a choice between two alternative 
rewards, the individual will choose to receive the alternative that offers the higher monetary value. This postulate 
assumes that the cost of the two alternatives is identical. 
4
 Although monetary incentives can decrease task performance due to the incentives crowding out intrinsic interest 
(e.g. Fessler 2003), the evidence is inconclusive. For effort-sensitive, non-creative tasks, cash incentives often have 
a positive effect on task performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). For creative tasks, where intrinsic interest is 
thought to have a more significant impact on performance, monetary incentives can still positively affect 
performance (Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Reeves and Read 2009). For example, Kachelmeier et al. (2008) show that 
piece rate monetary incentives can increase weighted creative productivity and Reeves and Read (2009) speculate 
that the use of monetary incentives may activate greater excitement and task engagement.  
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for immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; 
Ainslie 1975; Frederick et al. 2002). Individuals discount near future events less than distant 
future events because, ceteris paribus, events taking place in the near future are more likely to 
have a greater impact on the individual’s immediate well-being than events taking place in the 
distant future.5,6 Individuals prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption due to 
psychological preferences for immediacy that arise from ‘visceral’ factors related to 
impulsiveness, impatience and a desire for instant gratification (Ainslie 1975; Frederick et al. 
2002).7  
2.3 Conceptualizing Incentives and Effects of Payoff Timing 
 
In this section, this study examines how cash and non-cash incentives can be concretely 
or abstractly conceptualized and how these conceptualizations are be affected by incentive 
payoff timing. Examining how different incentive type and payoff timing combinations are 
conceptualized is useful because CLT suggests that concrete and abstract conceptualizations of 
future events affect how task-related information is processed (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 
2007; Malkoc et al. 2010).  
 
 
 
                                                            
5
 The discounted utility model formalizes intertemporal discounting by transforming future well-being into a present 
value based on an individual’s time preference, i.e., discount rate. Individuals’ time preferences, as evidenced in 
their implicit discount rates, are not constant and often decline over time, i.e., hyperbolic discounting (Thaler 1981; 
Frederick et al. 2002). Variation in the discount rates over different time horizons indicates that individuals are more 
sensitive to differences in the time horizons of events taking place in the near future but are less sensitive to 
differences in the time horizons of events taking place in the distant future.  
6
 Discounted utility theory is particularly relevant to accounting settings because it provides the theoretical 
foundation for the time value of money calculations that are commonly found in accounting textbooks (e.g., 
Horngren et al. 2003).  
7
 There are instances when individuals may derive utility from postponing consumption (Loewenstein 1987; Nowlis 
et al. 2004). This occurs when the individual enjoys not only the experience of consumption but also the anticipation 
of consumption, i.e., anticipatory pleasure.  
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2.3.1 Construal Level Theory and Psychological Distance 
CLT suggests that individuals conceptualize future events either concretely or abstractly 
depending on the perceived psychological distance between the individual and the event 
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Trope and Liberman 2010). When future 
events are perceived as being psychologically near, they are conceptualized concretely in terms 
of localized details and practicality. When future events are perceived as being psychologically 
distant, they are conceptualized abstractly in terms of general characteristics and ideals. For 
example, when reading the Wall Street Journal is perceived as being psychologically near, the 
act of reading is concretely conceptualized as turning pages and visually scanning rows of letters. 
Alternatively, when reading the Wall Street Journal is perceived as being psychologically 
distant, the act of reading is abstractly conceptualized as obtaining valuable, but “far off” 
business information, information that can be used, for example, to improve future business 
decisions and enhance career prospects.  
Although perceived psychological distance is affected by a range of factors, temporal 
distance has been identified as being particularly important (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope 
and Liberman 2003; Trope et al. 2007). Events taking place in the near future are perceived as 
being psychologically near and are concretely conceptualized in terms of specific details and 
immediate practicality. Events taking place in the distant future are perceived as being 
psychologically distant and are abstractly conceptualized in terms of general characteristics and 
overall desirability (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003). For example, when a 
manager perceives attending an out-of-town meeting as being psychologically near in that the 
meeting will be held the next day, most managers will concretely conceptualize the meeting in 
terms of specific details such as the departure time of the airplane and the address of the meeting 
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location. In contrast, when a manager perceives attending an out-of-town meeting as being 
psychologically distant, as, for instance, a meeting that will be held in three months, most 
managers conceptualize the meeting abstractly in terms of general attributes such as whether 
attending the meeting is strategically beneficial.  
2.3.2 Conceptualizing Incentives         
 This study applies CLT to a setting where incentives are either cash or non-cash. Cash 
and non-cash incentives can be situated along a concrete-abstract continuum depending on their 
perceived psychological distance. Cash incentives are psychologically near and concretely 
conceptualized because cash is the most frequently used method of payment in point-of-sale 
retail transactions and is the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation (Baker et 
al. 1988; Arango et al. 2011). In contrast, non-cash incentives are psychologically distant and 
abstractly conceptualized because non-cash incentives, such as vacations to exotic destinations, 
are often luxuries that employees do not routinely experience (Jeffrey 2009). Non-cash 
incentives are also more psychologically distant because they often have no immediate practical 
use and are frequently incorporated into abstract retail reward point programs (Alonzo 1996; 
Presslee et al. 2013). 
Although the current study draws on CLT to situate cash and non-cash incentives on a 
concrete-abstract continuum depending on their psychological distance, it differs from prior CLT 
research. No other CLT study has examined how different incentives are conceptualized and 
whether the effect of incentives on behavior is consistent with CLT predictions. Moreover, in 
this study CLT is being applied to a setting that involves actual economic incentives and this is 
advantageous because behavior predicted by psychological theories may not generalize well to 
settings where economic incentives are provided (Grether and Plott 1979; Smith 1991).  
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While CLT suggests that individuals’ conceptualizations of future events, such as 
receiving an incentive bonus, can be affected by the characteristics of the event itself, these 
conceptualizations are also affected by the timing of the event (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope 
and Liberman 2003). In the next section, I examine how employees’ conceptualizations of 
different incentive types are affected by incentive payoff timing.  
2.3.3 Effects of Incentive Payoff Timing on How Incentives Are Conceptualized 
This research applies CLT to a setting where incentives are paid in either the near or 
distant future. The effects of incentive payoff timing on how employees conceptualize incentives 
are examined as CLT suggests that temporal distance affects perceived psychological distance. 
When firms pay incentives in the near future, employees are likely to conceptualize the 
incentives more concretely and in greater detail because the payment is psychologically near. By 
way of contrast, when firms pay incentives in the distant future, employees are more likely to 
conceptualize the incentives more abstractly and in more general terms because the payment is 
psychologically distant. This distinction between near and distant future payoffs is particularly 
relevant to accounting research because although different payoff timings can have different 
performance effects, most incentive studies only examine incentive schemes with near future 
payoffs (i.e., less than a month) (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Condly et al. 2003).8  
Although this study draws on CLT to analyze how incentive payoff timing can affect how 
employees conceptualize different incentive types, it differs from prior CLT research that 
                                                            
8
 Employee perceptions of incentives can also be affected by incentive payoff timing due to the effects of 
anticipatory pleasure which is described above (Loewenstein 1987; Nowlis et al. 2004). Employee perceptions of 
incentives can also be affected by incentive payoff timing due to cognitive processing effects (Loewenstein 1987; 
Kida and Smith 1995; Nowlis et al. 2004; Mercer 2005). Incentive payoff timing can affect how employees process 
incentive-related information because individuals tend to rely more on cognitive-based judgments for shorter time 
horizons and affect-based judgments for longer time horizons (Kida and Smith 1995; Mercer 2005). The effects of 
incentive payoff timing on how incentives are perceived are examined in greater detail in the Supplementary 
Analysis section.  
 
12 
 
examines the effects of time. While most CLT studies take place in settings involving imaginary 
future events (e.g. Trope and Liberman 1998; Liberman et al. 2002), this study takes place in a 
setting involving a real future event, i.e., an incentive bonus payoff. It is helpful to use a realistic 
future event when studying the effects of time because individuals often respond differently to 
realistic vs. hypothetical events, particularly when financial incentives are involved (Smith 1991; 
Coller and Williams 1999; Brosig et al. 2003; Nowlis et al. 2004). 
In the previous two sections, incentive type and payoff timing are described with respect 
to their independent effects on how employees conceptualize incentives. In the next section, 
incentive type and payoff timing are described with respect to their joint effect on how 
employees conceptualize incentives due to (mis)matching of psychological distances. 
2.3.4 Matching of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing 
Because incentive payoff timing can affect the extent to which an incentive is concretely 
or abstractly conceptualized, it is important to identify the joint effects of different incentive type 
and payoff timing combinations. When the psychological distance of the incentive type 
“matches” the psychological distance of the incentive payoff timing, employees are likely to 
conceptualize the combination either concretely or abstractly. For example, when a cash 
incentive is matched with a near future payoff, employees concretely conceptualize the 
combination because cash incentives and near future payoffs are both psychologically near. 
When a non-cash incentive is matched with a distant future payoff, employees abstractly 
conceptualize the combination because non-cash incentives and distant future payoffs are both 
psychologically distant. In contrast, employees are likely to conceptualize an incentive type and 
payoff timing combination more neutrally when there is a “mismatch” between incentive type 
and payoff timing due to the offsetting effects of psychological distance. These offsetting effects 
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occur when a cash incentive is mismatched with a distant future payoff and non-cash incentives 
are mismatched with a near future payoff.  
Having described the joint effects of different incentive type and payoff timing 
combinations, I next predict how these combinations affect task performance. Because different 
incentive type and payoff timing combinations activate different information processing 
orientations and because some information processing orientations are better suited for some 
tasks than for others, I predict that the joint effect of incentive type and payoff timing on task 
performance depends on task type. 
2.4 Effects of Incentive Type, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance  
This section examines how different incentive type and payoff timing combinations 
affect task performance by influencing how employees process task-related information. 
Investigating the effects of different incentive type and payoff timing combinations on task 
performance is a contribution because some combinations improve performance of some tasks 
while impairing performance of other tasks.  
2.4.1 Information Processing and Task Type 
CLT research indicates that the characteristics and timing of a future event can affect how 
an individual conceptualizes the event, which, in turn, affects whether a local or global 
information processing orientation is adopted (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007). When an 
event is concretely conceptualized because of its detailed, practical characteristics and near 
future timing, individuals process information in a localized, piecemeal fashion (Forster et al. 
2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010). When an event is abstractly conceptualized because 
of its general characteristics and distant future timing, individuals process information in a 
global, holistic fashion (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007 Malkoc et al. 2010). 
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The effects of local and global information processing on task performance depend on 
what type of task is being performed (Schooler et al. 2002; Forster 2004). A local information 
processing orientation can improve performance of tasks that require detailed analysis and 
following step-by-step procedures. A global information processing orientation can improve 
performance of tasks that require insight and creativity.  
Distinguishing between different types of tasks impacts accounting research in that prior 
studies have shown that incentive scheme effectiveness can vary depending on whether the task 
is a highly-structured, analytic task or a loosely-structured, creative task (Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010). While incentives can 
positively affect performance of effort-sensitive analytic tasks, incentives can negatively affect 
performance of creative tasks by “crowding out” intrinsic task interest (Deci et al. 1999; Bonner 
and Sprinkle 2002; Fessler 2003; Kachelmeier et al. 2008). Firms benefit from distinguishing 
between analytic and creative tasks because firms frequently combine different task types and 
task attributes into a single job which can enhance or diminish the overall effectiveness of the 
incentive scheme (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  
2.4.2 Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Analytic and Creative Task Performance  
The thesis experimental setting includes different incentive type and payoff timing 
combinations. These combinations can be conceptualized concretely or abstractly. When the 
combination is concretely conceptualized (because a cash incentive is matched with a near future 
payoff), employees are more likely to adopt a localized information processing orientation 
characterized by attention to details, practicality and feasibility. When the combination is 
abstractly conceptualized (because a non-cash incentive is matched with a distant future payoff), 
employees are inclined to adopt a globalized information processing orientation characterized by 
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attention to generalities and overall desirability. When cash incentives are mismatched with 
distant future payoffs or non-cash incentives are mismatched with near future payoffs, 
information processing is likely to be impeded or disrupted because of offsetting effects.  
When performing an analytic task, the most effective incentive type and payoff timing 
combination should be cash that is paid in the near future. This prediction is consistent with 
conventional economic and psychological theories. It is consistent with economic theory where 
cash is frequently viewed as being the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation 
and individuals generally prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson 
1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick et al. 2002). It is consistent with construal 
and information processing theories because the matching of cash incentives with a near future 
payoff can activate a concrete information processing orientation that is well-suited to 
performing detail-oriented, analytic tasks (Liberman and Trope 1998; Schooler et al. 2002; Trope 
and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010; Trope and 
Liberman 2010). This line of argumentation leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1:  For analytic tasks, a cash incentive with a near future payoff is the most effective 
combination of incentive type and payoff timing.  
 
When performing a creative task, the most effective incentive type and payoff timing 
combinations should be a cash incentive that is paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive 
that is paid in the distant future. This prediction is consistent with there being separate economic 
and information processing effects. It is consistent with economic theory, as described above, in 
that cash is the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation and individuals 
generally prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 
1960; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick et al. 2002). This prediction is also consistent with 
psychological theory where the matching of a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff can 
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activate an abstract information processing orientation that is well-suited to performing creative 
tasks (Liberman and Trope 1998; Schooler et al. 2002; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 
2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010; Trope and Liberman 2010). Given this line of 
thinking, I posit:  
H2:  For creative tasks, a cash incentive with a near future payoff and a non-cash 
incentive with a distant future payoff are the most effective combinations of 
incentive type and payoff timing.  
 
Finally, the research question of whether a cash incentive with a near future payoff or a 
non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff is the most effective incentive type and payoff 
timing combination for a creative task can be posed. Economic and psychological theories make 
different predictions about employee performance. Economic theory predicts that cash incentives 
paid in the near future will be most effective due to the economic preferences of the employees. 
CLT predicts that non-cash incentives paid in the distant future will be most effective since the 
matching of a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff activates a global information 
processing orientation that is well-suited to performing creative tasks. Therefore, the following 
contingent research question can be articulated: 
RQ1: For creative tasks, will a cash incentive with a near-future payoff or a non-cash 
incentive with a distant future payoff be more effective? 
 
III. METHOD 
3.1 Experimental Design and Task Description 
A laboratory experiment has been selected as the most appropriate method for examining 
the contravening effects of incentives, payoff timing perceptions, and task type. It employs a 2 x 
2 x 2 between-group, within-subjects, mixed design in which incentive type, incentive payoff 
timing, and task type are each manipulated at two levels. The first independent variable, 
incentive type, is manipulated between subjects at the cash or non-cash levels. The second 
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independent variable, incentive payoff timing, is manipulated between subjects at the near future 
or distant future levels. The third independent variable, task type, is manipulated, within subjects, 
at the two levels of analytic or creative task type. Participants perform each task for five rounds 
after completing one practice round per task. The unit of analysis was total performance for each 
task over five rounds.  
There are two dependent variables, depending on the task type, “problems solved-
analytic” and “problems solved-creative.” For each task, problems-solved is measured as the 
total number of problems solved across all five performance rounds.  
3.2 Experimental Procedures 
 Participants perform two tasks at their individual computer terminal as described in the 
experiment timeline shown in Figure 1.9 The tasks consist of alpha-numeric decoding problems 
and creative word association problems. The order of the tasks is randomized to control for order 
effects.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
After receiving instructions and taking a comprehension check quiz, participants began 
the first task. Participants started the task by performing a two and a half minute practice round 
that consisted of four practice problems. Upon completing the practice round, participants 
responded to questions related to their perceptions of the task. Participants were then provided 
information describing their performance bonuses and were required to correctly answer all 
questions on the performance bonus quiz before proceeding.  
Once participants successfully passed the performance bonus quiz, they completed five, 
three-minute performance rounds with each round consisting of nine problems. Participants 
received performance feedback after completing each round. Feedback consisted of the bonus 
                                                            
9
 The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). 
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amount earned that period. For every problem correctly solved, participants earned either $1 or 1 
Lifestyle Rewards point depending on their incentive type condition. Upon completing the first 
task, the participants answered additional questions related to their perceptions of the task. These 
instrument items, along with the practice round questions, are asked in order to assess whether 
incentive type and payoff timing crowd out participants’ intrinsic task interest (e.g., Fessler 
2003).  
Following the completion of the first task, participants were given a distractor task that 
consisted of providing demographic information. The distractor task helps to avoid cognitive 
processing effects activated during the first task from spilling over and affecting performance 
during the second task. Participants then completed the second task, which was organized 
identically to the first task. After completing the second task, they filled out a post-experimental 
questionnaire, received a $5 show-up fee and were given a receipt for their performance bonus.  
In order to collect their performance bonuses, all participants had to return for a second 
session. The date of the second session was determined by participants’ incentive payoff timing 
condition, i.e., one day or six weeks following the first session. During the second session, 
participants completed a second post-experimental questionnaire, received another $5 show-up 
fee and were paid the bonus that they earned during the first session The average performance 
bonus earned by each participant was approximately $25.  
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3.3 Incentive Type 
 Incentive type was manipulated between subjects at two levels as shown in Appendix A: 
cash or non-cash. In the cash incentive condition, participants were informed that they could earn 
a cash bonus based on their performance. The cash incentive manipulation contained a written 
description of the cash incentive as well as three images of cash. Images of cash were included in 
the manipulation in order to make the incentive more salient and to maintain consistency with 
the non-cash incentive condition which contains images of three retail store logos.  
  In the non-cash incentive condition, participants earned Lifestyle Rewards points based 
on their performance. The non-cash incentive manipulation contained a written description of the 
non-cash incentives as well as images of the logos of the three retailers included in the Lifestyle 
Rewards program. Images of the non-cash incentives were included in the manipulation in order 
to make the incentives more salient and to maintain consistency with the cash incentive 
condition.  
Participants in the non-cash incentive condition converted Lifestyle Reward points, 
which were earned during the experiment, into retail gift cards that could be used at AMC 
Theaters, Cheesecake Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. These three retailers were selected for 
the Lifestyle Rewards program because pretesting indicated that college-age students find these 
retailers attractive and are associated with entertainment and recreation. The Lifestyle Rewards 
program was more abstract than cash because the retailers used in the program provided goods 
and service that are non-essential luxuries that students typically do not use every day. Similarly, 
the Lifestyle Rewards program was more abstract than cash since the incentive scheme itself 
consists of an abstract point system that requires the conversion of Lifestyle Rewards points into 
a retail dollar amount.  
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3.4 Payoff Timing 
 Payoff timing was manipulated between subjects at two levels: near future or distant 
future. In the near-future payoff condition, participants received their bonus payments one day 
following the experiment. In the distant-future payoff condition, participants received their bonus 
payments six weeks following the experiment. Participants in both conditions were required to 
return to the same bonus distribution location to collect their bonuses in order to ensure that 
participants across conditions exerted the same level of effort. This design feature rules out the 
possibility that differences in the anticipated effort required to collect future bonus payments 
affects performance. The one day and six week payoff delays effectively operationalized the near 
and distant future time constructs as evidenced by pre-test results where individuals consistently 
viewed one day as being closer in time than six weeks (t = 3.28; p < 0.01; two-tailed).  
3.5 Task Type          
 Task type was manipulated within subjects at two levels as shown in Appendix B: 
analytic and creative. In the analytic task condition, participants performed alpha-numeric 
decoding consisting of 10 numbers per problem that need to be decoded into letters. The alpha-
numeric decoding task is frequently used in accounting studies as an effort-sensitive task (Chow 
1983; Church et al. 2008). Different decoding keys are used each round to avoid possible 
performance effects associated with participants memorizing the decoding key. Alpha-numeric 
decoding effectively operationalized the analytic task construct because it involved highly 
detailed information processing whereby the correct solution can be arrived at using a direct, 
algorithmic problem solving approach (see Ashton 1990 for discussion of task characteristics). 
In the creative task condition, participants solved Remote Associate Test problems which 
are creative word problems that require participants to provide a word that links three seemingly 
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unrelated words (Mednick 1962, Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003). For example, the three words 
“Cottage-Swiss-Cake” are related by the word “Cheese.” The Remote Associate Test problems 
effectively operationalized the creative task construct because it involved highly abstract 
information processing whereby the correct solution could only be obtained using an indirect, 
heuristic problem solving approach. Remote Associate Test problems are frequently used as 
measures of individual creativity (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003).  
3.6 Participants  
 Eight computerized sessions were held in an experimental economics laboratory at a 
large university in the Southeast United States. Fourteen participants participated in each session 
for a total of 112 participants (8 X 14). The eight sessions were combined to create the four 
between-group conditions with 28 participants per condition: cash/near-future; cash/distant-
future; non-cash/near-future and non-cash/distant future. The participants, who were 
undergraduate, native English speakers, were randomly selected from an online experimental 
economics data base.10 Participants were randomly selected in order to obtain a representative 
sample of the undergraduate student population. Each participant was randomly assigned to one 
of the four between-group conditions. Participants were randomly assigned in order to ensure 
that the attributes of the participants across all four conditions were similar. Four participants 
were withdrawn from the total sample because they indicated on the post-experiment 
questionnaire that they were not native English speakers. An additional participant was 
withdrawn from the total sample because he did not complete the study.11 The average age of the 
participants was 20.6 years and is not significantly different across conditions (p = 0.86). About 
54 percent of the participants were female and there were no significant gender differences 
                                                            
10
 Participants were required to be native English language speakers because the Creative Task (Remote Associate 
Test word problems) requires English language fluency. 
11
 The results are inferentially identical if these five participants are included in the sample.  
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across conditions (p = 0.79).12 Because there were no age and gender differences across 
conditions, these demographic factors were not included in subsequent analysis.  
IV. RESULTS 
4.1 Validation of Operational Variables 
Before analyzing the results of the experiment, the research instrument was validated. 
First is validation of the incentive type manipulation. Because psychology theory indicates that 
conceptual concreteness is associated with increased concerns for feasibility and practicality 
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003), a three-item “concreteness” factor was 
created consisting of how practical, useful and functional participants perceived their incentive to 
be using 7-point semantic differential scales (Eigen Value = 2.47; variance explained = 82.4%). 
The scales ranged from 1 (Not practical/useful/functional) to 4 (moderately 
practical/useful/functional) to 7 (very practical/useful/functional).13 By regressing this factor 
onto incentive type, I found that participants provided with cash incentives perceived their 
incentive type to be significantly more concrete than those who received the non-cash incentives 
(t = 6.06; p < 0.01, two-tailed). This result is consistent with cash incentives being 
conceptualized more concretely than non-cash incentives. 
Second was validation of the payoff timing manipulation. Psychological theory indicates 
that near future events are conceptualized more concretely than distant future events (Trope and 
Liberman 2003). To validate that participants perceived payments that are received the following 
day as being closer in time than payments received six weeks later, a 7-point semantic 
differential scale was used. It ranged from 1 (not near future) to 4 (moderately near future) to 7 
(very near future). Results indicate that participants in the near future payoff condition perceived 
                                                            
12
 Since this was a random assignment experiment, the likelihood of gender or any other common differences across 
subjects is greatly reduced by the design itself. 
13
 A semantic differential scale, which uses intervals, allows parametric statistics to be used for data analysis. 
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their payoffs as being significantly closer in time than participants in the distant future payoff 
condition (5.72 vs. 3.07; t = 8.58; p < 0.01, two-tailed).  
Third was validation of the task type manipulation. To validate that participants 
perceived the decoding task as an analytic task and the Remote Associate word task as a creative 
task, participants were asked to record the extent to which they believed each task required 
imagination using a 7-point semantic differential scale. The scale ranged from 1 (no imagination) 
to 4 (moderate imagination) to 7 (a lot of imagination). Results indicate that the Remote 
Associate Test problems were perceived as requiring significantly more imagination than the 
decoding problems (5.79 vs. 1.97; t = 18.59; p < 0.01, two-tailed). This result is consistent with 
the Remote Associate Test problems being commonly used as a measure of creativity (Mednick 
1962, Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003). 
4.2 Measures and Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used to test H1, 
H2 and RQ1. As reported in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 2, analytic task performance is 
directionally higher when cash incentives were paid in the near future compared to other 
incentive type and payoff timing combinations (cash/near future mean = 25.48 > other 
combinations). This pattern in the dependent variable is consistent with H1.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
       Insert Table 1 here     
 As reported in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 3, creative task performance is directionally 
higher when cash incentives are paid in the near future and when non-cash incentives are paid in 
the distant future (cash/near future mean = 27.48 and non-cash/distant future mean = 27.78 > 
other combinations). This pattern in the dependent variable is consistent with H2. 
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Insert Figure 3 here  
Insert Table 2 here 
My research question evaluates whether cash incentives paid in the near future or non-
cash incentives paid in the distant future are associated with higher levels of creative task 
performance. As reported in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 3, creative task performance is 
similar regardless of whether cash incentives are paid in the near future or non-cash incentives 
are paid in the distant future (27.48 vs. 27.78). 
4.3 Tests of Hypotheses and Research Question 
 H1 predicts that, when performing an analytic task, a cash incentive paid in the near 
future will be the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination.14 To test the 
effectiveness of this incentive type and payoff timing combination relative to other 
combinations, planned contrasts (Buckless and Ravenscoft 1990) can be utilized. Specifically, 
one assigns +3 to cash/near future, -1 to cash/distant future, -1 to non-cash/near future, and -1 to 
non-cash/distant future. The dependent variable is problems solved-analytic.    
 As reported in Table 3-Panel A, H1 is supported (t = 2.10, p = 0.02, one-tailed).15 These 
results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing analytic tasks, the 
most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing is cash paid in the near future.  
Insert Table 3 here 
H2 predicts that, when performing a creative task, a cash incentive paid in the near future 
and a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future will be the most effective incentive type and 
payoff timing combinations. To evaluate the effectiveness of these incentive type and payoff 
                                                            
14
 Task order was tested and found to have an insignificant effect on performance (p > 0.32, two-tailed). Because 
task order does not have an effect on performance, task order is not included in the analysis. 
15
 The results are inferentially identical when the cash/near-future condition is individually compared to the other 
conditions.  
25 
 
timing combinations relative to other combinations, planned contrasts were used again. 
Specifically, one assigns +2 to cash/near future, -2 to cash/distant future, -2 to non-cash/near 
future, and +2 to non-cash/distant future. The dependent variable is problems solved-creative.16  
As reported in Table 3-Panel B, H2 is supported (t = 2.19, p = 0.02, one-tailed).17 These 
results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing creative tasks, the 
most effective combinations of incentive type and payoff timing are cash incentives paid in the 
near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future.  
Finally, RQ1 investigates when performing a creative task, whether a cash incentive paid 
in the near future or non-cash incentive paid in the distant future will be the most effective 
incentive type and payoff timing combination. To evaluate the relative effectiveness of each 
combination, their mean performance scores were compared using a t-test. The dependent 
variable is problems solved-creative.  
As reported in Table 3-Panel C, a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future is equally 
effective as a cash incentive paid in the near future (27.78 vs. 27.48) (t = 0.16, p = 0.87, two-
tailed). These results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing 
creative tasks, either cash incentives paid in the near future or non-cash incentives paid in the 
distant future are equally effective. However, to the extent that firms can provide non-cash 
incentives at a lower cost than cash incentives, firms can benefit from substituting non-cash 
incentives for cash.  
 
 
                                                            
16
 The planned contrast model used to test H2 is identical to conventional ANOVA which assigns equal weights to 
each condition. Planned contrasts are used to test H2 in order to be consistent with the testing of H1.  
17
 The results are inferentially identical when the cash incentive-near future and non-cash incentive-distant future 
conditions are separately compared to the other conditions.  
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4.4 Supplemental Analysis 
In order to provide further evidence that the pattern of results is consistent with the theory 
used in this thesis, questionnaire data collected during both the first and second sessions was 
analyzed. This questionnaire data was used to assess whether participants’ perceptions of 
incentive type and payoff timing predict the pattern of results found in the two dependent 
variables. Questionnaire data was also used to rule out the alternative explanation that the pattern 
of results was due to cash and non-cash incentives differentially crowding out participants’ 
intrinsic interest in the tasks. Finally, questionnaire data was used to highlight how cash 
incentives paid in the near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future are both 
positively perceived but in different ways and with different behavioral effects.  
4.4.1 Perceptions of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing as Predictors of Performance  
Did participants’ self-reported perceptions of incentive type and payoff timing predict the 
pattern of the results found in the two dependent variables? Participants’ perceptions of incentive 
type concreteness and temporal distance, which are described above, were dichotomized based 
on whether they reflect a concrete or abstract orientation. These two dichotomous variables were 
then matched to reflect the main theoretical constructs used in the study: concrete incentive-
concrete payoff timing; concrete incentive-abstract payoff timing; abstract incentive-concrete 
payoff timing and abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing.  
These matched pairs of self-reported questionnaire data were next used to predict task 
performance based on the same planned contrasts that tested H1 and H2. Consistent with the 
planned contrasts used to test H1, concrete incentive-concrete payoff timing was assigned +3 
while concrete incentive-abstract payoff timing, abstract incentive-concrete payoff timing and 
abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing were each assigned -1. Consistent with the planned 
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contrasts used to test H2, concrete incentive-concrete payoff timing was assigned +2, concrete 
incentive-abstract payoff timing was assigned -2, abstract incentive-concrete payoff timing was 
assigned -2 and abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing is assigned +2. 
The results of the planned contrasts are consistent with the theories used to motivate H1 
and H2. Consistent with H1, participants who perceived their incentive type and payoff timing 
most concretely demonstrated significantly higher analytic task performance (t = 1.97; p = 0.03, 
one-tailed). These participants were also significantly more likely to be in the cash/near-future 
condition (p < 0.01, one-tailed). Consistent with H2, participants who perceived their incentive 
type and payoff timing most concretely or most abstractly had the highest level of creative task 
performance while controlling for intrinsic task interestingness (t = 1.46; p = 0.07, one-tailed). 
Participants in these two groups were also significantly more likely to be in either the cash/near-
future or non-cash/distant future conditions (p < 0.01, one-tailed). These results support the 
theories used to develop the hypotheses because the results indicate that task performance is 
predicted by whether incentive type and payoff timing are concretely or abstractly 
conceptualized. 
4.4.2 Intrinsic Task Interest  
In order to rule out the possibility that the pattern of results is due to the incentives 
differentially crowding out intrinsic task interest, questionnaire data was employed to examine 
whether intrinsic task interest varies by incentive type. Intrinsic task interest was selected 
because prior research has shown that extrinsic, performance contingent rewards, such as piece 
rate incentives, can decrease intrinsic motivation without providing an offsetting increase in 
extrinsic motivation (Deci et al. 1999; Fessler 2003). Because the decrease in intrinsic 
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motivation may not be offset by an equivalent increase in extrinsic motivation, task performance 
can be negatively affected. 
Participant perceptions of task interestingness was measured at the beginning and end of 
the analytic and creative tasks using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 
(not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting). Task interestingness was 
measured at the beginning and end of each task to control for the effects of performance 
feedback biasing participant perceptions of task interestingness. As reported in Table 4, results 
indicate that beginning and ending task interestingness does not vary by incentive type (all p’s > 
0.40, two-tailed). Results also indicate that the change in task interestingness does not vary by 
incentive type (all p’s > 0.50, two-tailed). These results rule out the alternative explanation that 
the observed differences in task performance are due to the incentives differentially crowding out 
participants’ intrinsic interest in the task.  
Insert Table 4 here 
4.4.3 Variation in Positive Perceptions  
In this section, I explore how cash incentives paid in the near future and non-cash 
incentives paid in the distant future can both be perceived positively but in different ways and 
with different behavioral effects. The circumstances where cash incentives paid in the near future 
are perceived more positively are first examined with respect to participants’ anticipated 
enjoyment, choice preferences, and bonus collection rates. Participants’ anticipated enjoyment, 
which measures how enjoyable participants think it will be to use their bonuses, was measured at 
the end of the first session using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not 
enjoyable) to 4 (moderately enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable). Consistent with conventional 
economic theory, first session questionnaire responses indicate that participants in the cash/ near-
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future condition anticipated enjoying their performance bonuses more than participants in the 
non-cash/distant-future condition (6.04 vs. 5.15; t = 1.97, p = 0.05, two-tailed).18  
Participant incentive type and payoff timing choice preferences were also measured. 
Participants were asked, at the end of the second session, to make a hypothetical choice between 
a cash or non-cash incentive bonus and a one day or six week payoff delay. Participants were 
asked to make this hypothetical choice at the end of the second session in order to prevent the 
questions from biasing participants’ responses to other questions. Results indicate that all 
participants preferred cash over non-cash incentives regardless of condition (48 vs. 0). 19 Most 
participants also preferred to be paid after a one day delay as opposed to a six week delay 
regardless of condition (47 vs. 1; chi-square = 44.10; p < 0.01; two-tailed). These results are 
consistent with conventional economic theory that suggests that employees will prefer cash paid 
in the near future. 
Participant incentive type and payoff timing preferences were also measured in the 
second session by counting the number of participants that actually showed up to collect their 
incentives bonuses. It is important to examine participants’ actual behavior because individuals 
may respond differently to hypothetical vs. real choices (Smith 1991). Consistent with the 
questionnaire data reported above, more participants in the cash/near-future condition collected 
their bonuses than those in the non-cash/distant-future condition (96% vs. 82%; chi-square = 
3.00, p = 0.08, two-tailed) although this effect was not significant at the .05 alpha protection 
level.  
                                                            
18
 In order to ensure comparability between the first and second sessions, the results reported in Table 5 only contain 
the responses of those participants who attended both the first and second sessions (N = 97). The first session results 
for anticipated enjoyment using this reduced sample are inferentially identical to the results reported above which 
are based on the entire sample (N = 107).  
19
 A chi-square test cannot be used to test incentive type choice preferences because participants’ preferences for 
cash were constant across both conditions. 
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What were the circumstances under which, if any, non-cash incentives paid in the distant 
future were positively perceived? These circumstances can be identified based on psychological 
theories related to anticipatory pleasure and affective information processing (Loewenstein 1987; 
Kida and Smith 1995; Nowliss et al. 2004; Mercer 2005). Theories related to anticipatory 
pleasure suggest that delayed consumption of desirable goods and services, such as non-cash 
incentives, is likely to increase pleasure because individuals can derive utility from both 
consumption and the anticipation of consumption (Loewenstein 1987; Nowliss et al. 2004). 
Theories related to affective information processing suggest that as time passes, individuals will 
adopt an information processing style that increasingly relies on affective-based reasoning as 
opposed to cognitive-based reasoning (Kida and Smith 1995; Mercer 2005). This shift towards 
affective information processing is likely to make non-cash incentives appear to be more 
desirable over time because non-cash incentives are frequently chosen by firms based on their 
hedonic appeal (Jeffrey 2009).  
Consistent with theories of anticipatory pleasure and affective information processing, 
data collected during the second session indicates that non-cash incentives become increasingly 
attractive over time compared to cash incentives. Although participants in the non-cash/distant-
future condition report significantly lower levels of anticipated enjoyment at the end of the first 
session, as reported in Table 5, there is no difference in anticipated enjoyment between 
conditions in the second session (cash/near future: 5.81 vs. non-cash/distant future 6.18; t = 1.07, 
p = 0.29, two-tailed). That those in the non-cash/distant-future condition feel increasingly 
positive about their incentive bonus over time is reflected in the changes in anticipated 
enjoyment between the first and second sessions. While anticipated enjoyment for participants in 
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the cash/near-future condition decreased between sessions, it increased for participants in the 
non-cash/distant-future condition (-0.19 vs. 0.96; t = 2.60, p = 0.02, two-tailed).  
Insert Table 5 here 
Participants’ positive responses to non-cash incentives paid in the distant future are also 
evidenced by how frequently they anticipate thinking about their bonus. Frequency of thought, 
which has been used in prior accounting studies as a measure of hedonic appeal, was measured 
during the second session using a question that asks participants to estimate how frequently they 
will think about using their incentive bonus on a seven-point semantic differential scale 1(not 
frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently) to 7 (very frequently) (Presslee et al. 2013). The results 
indicate that participants in the cash/near-future condition report that they will think about their 
bonuses less frequently than participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition (4.23 vs. 5.45; t 
= 2.51, p = 0.02, two-tailed).  
Participants’ positive responses to incentives in the non-cash/distant-future condition 
have important implications for employee satisfaction and word-of-mouth employee recruiting 
(Tansuhaj et al. 1988). When employees feel positively about their company and speak highly of 
their company to outsiders, potential job candidates outside the company are more likely to have 
a favorable impression of the company and a desire to seek employment at the company (Cable 
et al. 2000). Companies prefer to hire external job candidates, who are referred through this type 
of word-of-mouth recruiting, because it is more efficient than sifting “through a pile of strangers' 
resumes” (Weber and Kwoh 2013).  
In order to examine whether participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition spoke 
more frequently to others about their bonuses than those in the cash/near-future condition, 
participants were asked in the second session to report the frequency with which they discussed 
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their bonus with others. Discussion frequency was measured during the second session using a 
seven-point semantic differential scale that ranged from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately 
frequently) to 7 (very frequently). Consistent with employees speaking positively to others about 
their company, participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition discussed their incentive 
bonuses more frequently with others than those in the cash/near-future condition (2.58 vs. 3.86; t 
= 2.25; p = 0.03, two-tailed).20  
V. CONCLUSION 
 This study provides evidence that the effects of incentive type on performance depends 
on incentive payoff timing and task type. For an analytic task, I predicted and found evidence 
that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the most effective incentive type and payoff timing 
combination. This result is consistent with economic preferences and information processing 
having mutually reinforcing effects on employee performance. For a creative task, I predicted 
and found evidence that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid in 
the distant future are the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combinations. This 
result is consistent with the independent effects of economic preferences and information 
processing on employee performance. 
The results of this study have important implications for firms because they can help 
firms identify when non-cash incentives can be substituted for cash incentives without a 
reduction in performance. It is useful for firms to know when non-cash incentives can be 
substituted for cash since non-cash incentives are often less expensive than their retail cash 
                                                            
20
 Additional analysis, using the entire second session sample across all conditions (N = 97), indicates that 
participants in the cash incentive condition discussed their incentive bonus less frequently than those in the non-cash 
incentive condition (2.90 vs. 3.64; t=1.77, p=.08, two-tailed).This result suggests that the difference in discussion 
frequency between those in the cash/near-future condition and non-cash/distant future condition is not simply due to 
differences in incentive payoff timing, i.e., those paid in the near future simply had less time to discuss their bonus 
with others.  
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equivalents (Oyer 2008) and because non-cash incentives can attract and retain desirable 
employees (Prendergast 1999; Backes-Gellner and Tuor 2010). The results of this study indicate 
that non-cash incentives can be effectively substituted for cash incentives when the payoff is in 
the distant future and when the employees are performing creative tasks (H2, RQ1). Moreover, 
the results indicate (Supplemental Analysis) that firms may also benefit from the tendency of 
employees receiving this type of bonus payment to discuss their bonuses more frequently with 
others. This behavior has been identified as an important factor in word-of-mouth employee 
recruiting (Tansuhaj et al. 1988; Cable et al. 2000; Weber and Kwoh 2013).  
The results of the study also contribute to accounting research. It provides insight into the 
effects of non-cash incentives on performance (H1, H2, RQ1) which is important because this 
incentive type is widely used by firms but not well understood by researchers (Jeffrey 2009; 
Long and Shields 2010; Incentive Federation 2011; Presslee et al. 2013). It also contributes to 
accounting research by showing how both economic preferences and information processing 
effects can affect employee performance and incentive scheme effectiveness (Bonner et al. 2000; 
Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). By showing that the effect of incentive type and payoff timing on 
performance depends on task type, the study provides evidence that cash paid in the near future 
is not always the most effective combination (H2, RQ1) as suggested by conventional economic 
theory (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Similarly, by showing that 
incentive type and payoff timing differentially affect perceived incentive attractiveness 
(Supplemental Analysis), the study highlights possible secondary benefits associated with 
deferred compensation (Loewenstein 1987; Nowliss et al. 2004). Finally, this study contributes 
to a growing body of research related to how creative task performance (H2, RQ1) is affected by 
the use of incentives (Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010). 
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Figure 1 
Experiment Timeline  
 
 
General Instructions and 
Comprehension Check
Task #1 Instructions and 
Practice Round
Task #1 Questionnaire
Bonus Compensation 
Description and Manipulation 
Check
Task #2 Instructions and 
Practice Rounds
Task #2 Questionnaire
Task #2 Performance Rounds
PEQ Session #1 and Show-Up 
Fee Payment #1
PEQ Session #2 and Show-Up 
Fee Payment #2, Bonus 
Payment
Task #1 Performance Rounds
Demographic Survey Distractor 
Task
Bonus Compensation 
Description and Manipulation 
Check
40 
 
Figure 2 
Problems Solved-Analytic (5 Rounds) 
 
  
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each 
task. 
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Figure 3 
Problems Solved-Creative (5 Rounds) 
 
 
 
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each 
task. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics-Analytic Task 
(Mean and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Cash Incentives Non-cash Incentives 
 Near Future 
(n=27) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
Near Future 
(n=26) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
 
    
Round 1 4.59  
(1.37) 
4.07 
(1.49) 
4.12  
(1.48) 
4.41  
(0.93) 
 
    
Round 2 4.74  
(0.94) 
 
4.81  
(1.33) 
4.65  
(1.26) 
5.07  
(1.11) 
Round 3 5.30 
(1.10) 
4.93 
(1.44) 
4.88 
(1.31) 
4.74 
(1.16) 
 
    
Round 4 5.37 
(1.01) 
4.96 
(1.19) 
4.31  
(1.32) 
4.74  
(1.13) 
 
    
Round 5 5.48  
(1.12) 
4.93  
(1.36) 
4.65  
(1.26) 
4.44 
(1.01) 
 
    
Total Problems 
Solved 
25.48 
(4.07) 
23.70 
(5.66) 
22.62 
(5.10) 
23.41 
(4.22) 
 
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Problems Solved is the number of problem correctly solved.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics-Creative Task 
(Mean and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Cash Incentives Non-cash Incentives 
 Near Future 
(n=27) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
Near Future 
(n=26) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
 
    
Round 1 5.15  
(1.73) 
5.00 
(2.27) 
4.42  
(2.37) 
5.33  
(2.04) 
 
    
Round 2 5.00  
(1.69) 
 
4.85  
(1.59) 
4.62  
(2.17) 
5.37  
(2.24) 
Round 3 5.85 
(2.09) 
5.26 
(1.91) 
5.00 
(2.17) 
5.44 
(2.04) 
 
    
Round 4 5.89 
(1.81) 
5.19 
(1.50) 
4.73  
(1.61) 
5.85  
(1.54) 
 
    
Round 5 5.59  
(2.18) 
4.85  
(1.82) 
5.35  
(1.98) 
5.78 
(1.81) 
 
    
Total Problems 
Solved 
27.48 
(6.24) 
25.15 
(6.85) 
24.12 
(7.92) 
27.78 
(7.14) 
 
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives . 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Problems Solved is the number of problem correctly solved.  
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TABLE 3 
Test of Hypotheses and Research Question 
 
Panel A: H1: Problems Solved-Analytic Task (Rounds 1-5) 
 
 Value of 
Contrast* 
Standard 
Error 
t Df Significance 
(1-tailed) 
 6.72 3.21 2.10 103 .02 
 
 
Panel B: H2: Problems Solved-Creative Task (Rounds 1-5) 
 
 Value of 
Contrast** 
Standard 
Error 
t Df Significance 
(1-tailed) 
 11.99 5.46 2.19 103 .02 
 
 
Panel C: RQ1: Total Problems Solved-Creative Task- (Rounds 1-5) 
  (Cash Incentives-Near Future vs. Non-cash Incentives-Distant Future) 
 
 Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Difference 
t Df Significance 
(2-tailed) 
 .30 1.83 .16 52 .87 
      
 
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each 
task. 
*Contrast coefficients are 3 for Cash Incentives-Near Future, -1 for Cash-Distant Future, -1 for Non-cash 
Incentives -Near Future and -1 for Non-cash Incentives -Distant Future. 
**Contrast coefficients are 2 for Cash Incentives-Near Future, -2 for Cash-Distant Future, -2 for Non-
cash Incentives-Near Future and 2 for Non-cash Incentives-Distant Future.  
 
45 
 
TABLE 4 
Intrinsic Task Interest 
(Mean and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Cash Incentives Non-cash Incentives 
 Near Future 
(n=27) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
Near Future 
(n=26) 
Distant Future 
(n=27) 
 
    
Analytic Task 
Interest-Begin 
3.56  
(2.49) 
3.74 
(2.07) 
3.31  
(2.09) 
3.48  
(2.19) 
 
    
Analytic Task 
Interest-End 
3.63  
(2.34) 
 
3.56  
(2.21) 
3.38  
(1.96) 
3.19  
(2.19) 
Creative Task 
Interest-Begin 
5.67 
(2.09) 
4.52 
(2.28) 
5.50 
(1.86) 
4.74 
(1.81) 
 
    
Creative Task 
Interest-End  
5.63 
(1.98) 
4.89 
(1.93) 
5.54  
(1.88) 
5.41 
(1.74) 
 
    
 
    
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Analytic Task Interest-Begin is measured at the beginning of the analytic task after participants have 
performed several practice problems but have not received performance feedback. It assesses how 
interesting the analytic task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges 
from 1 (not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).  
Analytic Task Interest-End is measured at the end of the analytic task after participants have completed all 
five performance rounds and received performance feedback. It assesses how interesting the analytic 
task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not 
interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).  
Creative Task Interest-Begin is measured at the beginning of the creative task after participants have 
performed several practice problems but have not received performance feedback. It assesses how 
interesting the creative task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges 
from 1 (not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).  
Creative Task Interest-End is measured at the end of the creative task after participants have completed 
all five performance rounds and received performance feedback. It assesses how interesting the 
creative task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not 
interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).  
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TABLE 5 
Responses to Post-Experiment Questions 
 (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Cash Incentives Non-cash Incentives 
 Near Future 
(n=26)* 
Distant Future 
(n=26)* 
Near Future 
(n=23)* 
Distant Future 
(n=22)* 
 
    
Anticipated 
Enjoyment-  
Session 1 
6.00  
(1.47) 
6.08 
(1.35) 
5.35  
(1.70) 
5.23  
(1.85) 
 
    
Anticipated 
Enjoyment-  
Session 2 
 
5.81  
(1.33) 
 
6.23  
(1.14) 
5.91  
(1.16) 
6.18  
(1.05) 
Future 
Thinking  
4.23 
(1.86) 
4.96 
(1.54) 
4.91 
(2.02) 
5.45 
(1.44) 
 
 
    
Discuss with 
Others 
2.58 
(2.02) 
3.23 
(1.93) 
3.43  
(2.31) 
3.86  
(1.91) 
 
    
 
Variable Definitions 
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives. 
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash. 
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of 
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake 
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. 
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future. 
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their 
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after 
their session. 
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task 
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word 
problems. 
Anticipated Enjoyment-Session 1 is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 
1. It measures how much the participants anticipate that they will enjoy using their incentive bonus 
using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not enjoyable) to 4 (moderately 
enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable).  
Anticipated Enjoyment-Session 2 is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 
2. It measures how much the participants anticipate that they will enjoy using their incentive bonus 
using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not enjoyable) to 4 (moderately 
enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable).  
 Future Thinking is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 2. It measures 
how frequently the participants anticipate that they will think about using their incentive bonus using a 
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seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently) 
to 7 (very frequently).  
Discuss With Others is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 2. It measures 
how frequently the participants discussed their incentive bonus with others using a seven-point 
semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently) to 7 (very 
frequently).  
* n consists of those participants that showed-up for the second session and responded to the second post-
experiment questionnaire. 
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Appendix A 
Incentive Bonus Description-Cash  
 
Participation in today’s session qualifies you for a cash performance bonus. For every correctly 
solved problem, you earn a $1 cash credit. You can earn a maximum performance bonus of $45 
in cash. The performance bonus will be paid tomorrow/6 weeks from now during the second 
session or at a later date that is convenient to you. Further information about the second session 
will be provided at the end of today’s session. 
Your performance bonus will be based on how well you perform of one of the two tasks in 
today’s session. The task that is used to determine your bonus will be randomly selected at the 
end of today’s session. Because the task that is used to calculate the bonus is randomly selected, 
it is important to exert effort while performing both tasks.  
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Incentive Bonus Description-Non-Cash  
 
Participation in today’s session qualifies you for a Lifestyle Rewards performance bonus. 
Lifestyle Rewards are store credits that can be used to make retail purchases related to 
entertainment, specialty foods and recreation. The performance bonus will be paid tomorrow/6 
weeks from now during the second session or at a later date that is convenient to you. Further 
information about the second session will be provided at the end of today’s session. 
For every correctly solved problem, you earn one Lifestyle Rewards credit. Each Lifestyle 
Rewards credit has a $1 retail value. You can earn a maximum performance bonus of 45 
Lifestyle Rewards credits. You can redeem your Lifestyle Rewards at AMC Theaters, 
Cheesecake Factory and Dick’ Sporting Goods.  
Your performance bonus will be based on how well you perform of one of the two tasks in 
today’s session. The task that is used to determine your bonus will be randomly selected at the 
end of today’s session. Because the task that is used to calculate the bonus is randomly selected, 
it is important to exert effort while performing both tasks.  
`  
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Appendix B 
Task Screenshot-Analytic 
 
Round 1 Decoding Key 
 
1 8 11 13 16 22 23 28 29 31 37 42 44 
P Z B V J U Q T A K X L D 
 
 
47 51 53 58 62 74 75 83 84 85 86 91 97 
F Y I C W O M N S E G H R 
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Task Screenshot-Creative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
